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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Shayne Ray

appeals from his Judgment of Conviction and Commitment

for aggravated assault on certain personnel, with a weapons enhancement, and
misdemeanor resisting, delaying or obstructing an officer.

Burgess asserts that the

district court erred at trial by allowing the State to introduce on cross-examination his
inculpatory statements to Trooper Robinson. The statements were obtained in violation
of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Miranda v. Arizona, and the State did
not

its burden of showing that the statements were voluntary and that

being admitted for a permissible purpose. He further

were

that the district court erred

when it admitted his statement to hospital staff that he used methamphetamine on the
day of the incident because its unfairly prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its
probative value.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Burgess's wife was driving their car and he was in the passenger seat when
Trooper Tulleners attempted to stop them for not having a license plate. (Tr. 11 /20/13,
p.169, Ls.10-20.) Rather than pull over, Mr. Burgess's wife attempted to flee from the
police before finally stopping on the median side of the freeway. (Tr. 11 /20/13, p.170,
L.8 - p.173, L.25.)

Mr. Burgess got out of the car with a knife in his hand.

(Tr. 11/20/14, p.180, Ls.1-8.) Back-up officers arrived at the scene and hit Mr. Burgess
with multiple bean-bag shotgun rounds and three Taser cycles. (Tr. 11/21/13, p.106,
Ls. 7-16.) Officer Bateman testified that when he approached Mr. Burgess, Mr. Burgess
lunged at him with the knife. (Tr. 11/21/13, p.143, Ls.15-21.) Mr. Burgess testified that
he did not lunge at Officer Bateman, but fell forward when he was hit with a bean-bag.
1

(Tr. ·11 /22/13, p.237, Ls.9-19.) He further testified that he wanted to commit suicide and
he was hoping the officers would kill him. (Tr. 11/22/13, p.236, Ls.5-19.)
Mr. Burgess was charged with aggravated assault on certain personnel, with a
weapons enhancement, and misdemeanor resisting, delaying or obstructing an officer.
(R., p.46.) A jury trial began on November 20, 2013. (R., p.71.) Four police officers
testified for the State. (Tr.11/21/13, p.4, Ls.3-12.) Mr. Burgess was the only witness for
the defense.

(Tr. 11/22/14, p.234, Ls.21-24.)

After the close of the State's case,

defense counsel made a motion to exclude a statement made by Mr. Burgess to
hospital staff that he had used methamphetamine on the day of the offense on the
grounds that the evidence's prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative
value. (Tr. 11 /22/13, p.224, Ls.10-16, p.225, Ls.14-17.) The district court overruled the
objection and admitted the statement. (Tr. 11/22/13, p.226, Ls.8-14.)
Additionally, prior to Mr. Burgess's testimony, the State sought to admit
statements that Mr. Burgess made to Trooper Robinson 1 in the patrol car on the way to
the hospital after he was arrested. (Tr. 11/22/13, p.227, Ls.10-20.) Although the State
did not identify which statements it wanted to use, the prior statements by Mr. Burgess
that it ultimately introduced were:
1. "You guys aren't going to try and charge me with assault on an officer
because I was trying to die, not hurt anybody?"
2. "That's still going to come out with assault with a weapon or some shit like
that?"
The prosecutor admitted that he did not use the statements in his case-in-chief
"because there is no Miranda," but asserted, "I think it is permissible for me to cross-

1

Trooper Robinson was not a witness at trial.
2

examine Mr. Burgess on any statements he made to Trooper Robinson." (Tr. 11/22/13,
p.227, Ls.13, 17-19.) Defense counsel objected because the statements were obtained
in violation of Miranda v. Arizona 2 , and they were coerced. (Tr. 11/22/14, p.227, L.22
p.228, L.3.) The district court overruled the objection and did not make any findings as
to the voluntariness of the statements. (Tr. 11/22/14, p.228, Ls.4-5.)
The jury found Mr. Burgess guilty on all charges. (R., pp.120-123.) Mr. Burgess
timely appealed. (R., p.144.)

2

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err in when it allowed the State to introduce on crossexamination Mr. Burgess's inculpatory statements that were obtained in violation

of Miranda v. Arizona?
2.

Did the district court err when it admitted Mr. Burgess's statement that he used
methamphetamine on the day of the offense?
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I.
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The State To Introduce On Cross-Examination
Mr. Burgess's lnculpatory Statements That Were Obtained In Violation Of Miranda v.
Arizona

A.

Introduction
Mr. Burgess asserts that it was error for the district court to allow the State, on

cross-examination, to introduce his inculpatory statements to Trooper Robinson. The
statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, and the State did not meet
its burden of showing that the statements were voluntary and that they were being
offered for a permissible purpose.

B.

Standard Of Review
Appellate courts review constitutional challenges de nova.

State v. Olson, 138

Idaho 438, 440 (2003).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Admitted Mr. Burgess's lnculpatory Statements
To Trooper Robinson During The State's Cross-Examination Of Mr. Burgess;
The Statements Were Obtained In Violation Of Miranda, And The Prosecution
Did Not Meet Its Burden Of Showing That The Statements Were Voluntary And
Were Being Offered For A Permissible Purpose
The State conceded that Mr. Burgess's inculpatory statements to Trooper

Robinson were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-46
(1966), and therefore could not be used in the State's case-in-chief.

(Tr. 11 /22/13,

p.227, Ls.12-14.) However, after the prosecutor rested his case, he requested that he
be permitted to "cross-examine Mr. Burgess on any statements he made to Trooper
Robinson" on the basis that "there has been no claim that those (statements] are
5

involuntary."

(Tr. 11/22/13, p.227, Ls.10-20.)

Defense counsel objected to the

admission of the statements, asserting that they were obtained in violation of Miranda
and, based on the facts, "it's inherently at some level of coercion." (Tr. 11/22/13, p.227,
L.22 - p.228, L.3.) The district court overruled the objection and, since it did not clarify
or limit its ruling, ostensibly admitted the statements for all purposes.

(Tr. 11/22/14,

p.228, Ls.4-5.)
Failure to

provide Miranda warnings

renders

a defendant's

statements

inadmissible, except for the limited purpose of impeachment. Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (holding that statements inadmissible against a defendant in
the prosecutor's case in chief due to a Miranda violation may, if its trustworthiness
satisfies legal standards, be used for impeachment purposes). However, in order to use
a statement obtained in violation of Miranda to impeach a defendant, the State must
prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntary.

Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 481 (1972); accord State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 70910 (1970); State

v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106 (1995). Here, the State did not

even attempt to meet its burden of showing that the statements were voluntary.
Additionally, "when a confession challenged as involuntary is sought to be
used against a criminal defendant at his trial, he is entitled to a reliable and clear-cut
determination that the confession was in fact voluntarily rendered." Lego, supra, 404
U.S. at 481. Here, the district court made no findings as to voluntariness. To determine
whether a confession is voluntary, a court must look to the "totality of the
circumstances" to determine "whether the defendant's will was overborne."

Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 191 (2000).

State v.

The court must consider certain factors in

determining whether the confession was voluntary:
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1) Whether Miranda warnings were given;
2) The youth of the accused;
3) The accused's level of education or low intelligence;
4) The length of the detention;
5) The repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and
6) Deprivation of food or sleep.

State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214 (1993). Here, the district court did not conduct any
analysis on the issue of voluntariness, let alone consider the factors required by the
United States Supreme Court.

Had the district court conducted this analysis, it could

have considered that, at the time he was questioned by Trooper Robinson on the way to
the hospital, Mr. Burgess was suicidal, he was high on methamphetamine, he had been
shot multiple times with "bean bag" shotgun rounds, he had been hit with a Taser three
times, and he had bleeding abrasions and bruises all over his body, including a gash on
his head.

(Tr. 11/22/14, p.236, Ls.7-15; Tr. 11/21/13, p.106, Ls.7-16; State's Trial

Exhibit 2; Defense Trial Exhibits 100, 101.) While the burden clearly remains with the
State to prove voluntariness, there is ample evidence to support defense counsel's
objection.
Further, even if the district court had determined that the State had somehow
proven that the statements were voluntary, the State did not ultimately use the
statements to impeach Mr. Burgess's testimony.

Impeachment evidence may not be

introduced on cross-examination unless the defendant opens the door by reasonably
suggesting the line of questioning. United States v. Martinez, 967 F .2d 1343, 134 7 (9th
Cir. 1992). Additionally, "when the defendant presents his or her case on direct without
raising issues that are open to impeachment, and the government cross-examines to
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elicit impeachable statements, the government must be prepared to use legitimate
evidence. It is error to permit the government to proceed to impeach its own induced
statements with inadmissible evidence." United States v. Whitson, 587 F.2d 948, 952953 (9th Cir. 1978) (referring to defendant's statements suppressed because of a

Miranda violation).
Here, the State did not even attempt to characterize the use of the statements as
impeachment. Rather, the prosecutor simply introduced the evidence for the first time
during its cross-examination of Mr. Burgess:
Q:

Did you give any thought as to what the officer had to go through?

A:

No, I didn't.

Q:

Well, you talked about Officer - Trooper Robinson. He's the one that took
you to the hospital?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

All right. As I listened to the tape, one of the first things that you're

worried about is a charge just like this, right?
A:

Uh-huh.

Q:

Is that a yes?

A:

Oh, no. I do not believe I said that, actually.

Q:

Well, let me ask you, you asked him, 'What jail am I going to," do you
remember that?

A:

Yes, I do, sir.

Q:

And he says, "I'm not taking you to jail.
right?

A:

Yes, sir.
8

I'm taking you to the hospital,"

Q:

And then you say, "You guys aren't going to try and charge me with
assault on an officer because I was trying to die, not hurt anybody?"

A:

I do not recall saying that. I do recall saying the part I was just trying to
die, not hurt anybody, though.

Q:

Do you recall still - telling him, "That it's still going to come out with
assault with a weapon or some shit like that?"

(Tr. 11/22/13, p.245, L.5 -p.246, L.12 (emphasis added).) The answer that prompted
the prosecutor to ask Mr. Burgess about his un-Mirandized statements to Trooper
Robinson was, "No, I didn't," in response to the question, "Did you give any thought as
to what the officer had to go through?" It was a complete non sequitur to "impeach" this
answer with statements about what charges Mr. Burgess thought he might be facing.
The State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements
were voluntary, and the district court erred by admitting the statements for any purpose
without making a finding that the statements were voluntary.

Further, even if such a

finding had been made, the statements were ultimately used for an impermissible
purpose.

11.
The District Court Erred When It Admitted Mr. Burgess's Statement That He Used
Methamphetamine On The Day Of The Incident Because Its Probative Value Was
Substantially Outweighed By Its Unfairly Prejudicial Effect

A.

Introduction
Mr. Burgess asserts that the district court erred when it admitted his statement to

hospital staff that he had used methamphetamine earlier in the day because its
probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
9

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing

determination

the

substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, the

the

is not

of discretion standard is applied.

v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 818 (Ct. App. 1993).

C.

The District Court Erred When It Admitted Mr. Burgess's Statement That He
Used Methamphetamine On The Day Of The Incident Because Its Probative
Value Was Substantially Outweighed By Its Unfairly Prejudicial Effect
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 states, "Although relevant, evidence may be

excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice." Mr. Burgess asserts that his statement that he used methamphetamine the
day

the incident is highly prejudicial and as such, any limited probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
The district court admitted the statement on the grounds that, "I think that's fair
game, particularly if he testifies - and particularly if he does testify as to state of mind or
his perceptions or his intentions." (Tr. 11/22/13, p.226, Ls.8-11.) However, the fact that
Mr. Burgess consumed methamphetamine on the day of the incident is not relevant to
the crime with which he was charged, and therefore has little probative value.
Aggravated assault is a general intent crime. See State v. Dudley, 137 Idaho 888, 89092 (Ct. App. 2002). As such, Mr. Burgess's state of mind or whether or not he intended
to harm Officer Bateman is not relevant.

The prosecutor acknowledged this in his

closing argument when he told the jury, 'The state is not required to prove anything
about what was going through his [Mr. Burgess's] head." (Tr. 11/22/13, p.299, Ls.8-10.)
However,

evidence

of

methamphetamine

use

is

highly

prejudicial.

Methamphetamine possesses a significant social stigma and, in the minds of the jurors,
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this one fact transformed Mr. Burgess from a mentally distraught, suicidal person to a
drug user. Clearly, the jury would place significant emphasis on this fact.
Because the evidence has little, if any, probative value and it prejudicial effect is
so great, Mr. Burgess asserts that the district court abused its discretion by admitting it.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Burgess respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and
remand his case to the district court for a new trial.
DATED this 28 th day of October, 2014.

KIMB~RL YE. SMITfi
J
Deputy State Appel1ate Public Defender
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